Jerome Zanchi (1516–1590) on the Mercy of God: General and Special

Zanchi:

Chap. 4.

Of the mercy of God.

The first Question.

Whether mercy be truly and properly attributed unto God.

Concerning this first question, the Stoics were of opinion that the name of mercy could by no mean be attributed to God, drawing a reason from the definition of mercy. For what is it else, say they, but weakness of mind, sadness and grief conceived upon an other’s misery and grief? and so does Cicero also define it as envy contrarily, is grief conceived of another’s prosperity. And so says Seneca also in his  book of clemency. Augustine also following in a manner the same definitions, says thus: “What is mercy but a certain compassion of another’s misery in our heart, by which we are compelled to help if we can?” and again, “Who knows not that hereof it is called mercy, for that it makes the heart miserable, grieving for another’s evil?” The like affirms Aristotle and Phavorinus. But no grief nor weakness can happen to God. For, if according to the Stoics’ opinion, it is not incident to a wise man, much less to God. But they are deceived. For God plainly calls himself merciful, and of great mercy. To the reason they bring, we make this answer: first, That it is manifest that God is not subject to grief nor weakness. But it therefore follows not, that therefore is is no mercy in God. For though man’s mercy defined by Cicero and others be a weakness of the mind; yet that Mercy which God attributes to himself, is not so. They only define that of men, but not that of God, and which the Scriptures speak of. Then the Latin word misericordia, we may thus interpret, as if we should take to heart another’s misery. If it was lawful for Augustine to derive it of miseria and corde, as that it is the misery of the heart conceived of another misery: why may not we say, that it is so called, for that we take another’s misery to heart? Truly this etymology can not be refuted by any good reason. And this definition does better agree with Mercy then that of Cicero’s, whether divine or human. For even God himself takes to heart the misery of his elect, as he teaches by his prophets. We commonly also call him merciful, not which has a miserable heart passively (for such a one is rather miserable then merciful), but actively, that is, him which desires and studies in his heart to help one in misery, and helps him as much as he is able. And so the Scripture calls men merciful: as where Christ says, “Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy,” Math. 5:7. But I pray you whom calls he merciful here? not those which have a merciful heart: but those which study and endeavor from the heart to help those that are in misery. But although the Latin word did signify that they would have it, yet neither the Hebrew word racham, used by the Prophets, nor the Greek word eleeo, used by the Apostles, does include any weakness or grief of mind, as they that have skill in these languages do well know: but only either love, and an inclining of the heart towards the evil affected, or else alms, the very effects of love: and hence is that of the Apostle, Rom. 12, “He which shows mercy,” that is, which gives alms to the needy, “let him do it with a cheerfulness.” Wherefore it signifies not sadness of heart, but a work of love done to the needy, with cheerfulness of heart. But let us grant that which they gather out of Cicero, Aristotle, Seneca, Augustine, that misericordia signifies grief and weakness of heart conceived from another’s misery: follows it therefore, that that name can by no means be attributed to God? are not also the names of love, hatred, anger, and such like, which signifies affects and passions attributed to God amongst profane authors? yes: but not after the same manner, that they are to us. For they are in him without passion, but not so in us. And why then may we not say the same of mercy? Therefore the Stoics’ opinion is utterly to be rejected who do not it any place in a wise man. There are others which think that the manner of mercy may be attributed to God, and that God is in the Scriptures worthily called merciful, and to be of great mercy, but improperly: as he is also said to repent, be angry, and such like. And they are led with the same reason that the former, to wit that it is a grief and passion of the mind, which God cannot be subject unto, and therefore that it is improperly attributed unto him. And this is the common opinion, which yet  I do not simply approve. For the reason why they think thus is, because they consider mercy in us, and then transfer it from us unto God: thinking that it is so properly and of itself called mercy, as it is in us: and  so for that it cannot be so in God, to wit, with passion, as it were in us, therefore they think it is improperly attributed unto God in the Scriptures. But it is my judgment far otherwise. For the name of mercy is first in God, before it is un us: for it was in him first: and it is eternal in God. And this gift and virtue of mercy, as all other good gifts, is given us of God: and therefore God is called, “Father of mercies: and we are commanded by Christ to imitate the Father’s mercy, as the rule of all true mercy. But God’s mercy, which is the true mercy, is not any infirmity. For God is merciful, of his own eternal and simple essence, as also good, gentle, and mighty: therefore that particle, weakness of mind, is not necessary in the definition of true mercy: but it is by accident that it is such in us: for that we are of such a nature as is subject to griefs and passions, so as we cannot bear, see, or think of another’s misery, especially if he be of our affinity, or nation, or else joined unto us by the bond of nature, or friendship, without sympathy and grief. Wherefore it is so far off, that because of the weakness of mind, which is not incident to God, but is incident to us, it should be attributed to God improperly, and properly to us: that contrarily rather, as wisdom, life, justice, goodness, and other good gifts, so also mercy should first of itself and properly be said of God, and secondly and less properly of us: for that it is perfection in God, and imperfect in us…

Samuel Otes (1578/9-1658) on Common and Special Mercy

Otes:

Mercy, which is the first thing here wished for, is ascribed to God, the Creator; Peace which is the scond, to Christ the Reconciler; Love, which is the third, to the Holy Ghost, the Comforter. For God here is called “The Father of Mercies,” Christ is called “Our Peace,”and the Holy Ghost, “Love.” The Apostle therefore in saying, Mercy, Peace, and love be multiplied, is as if he should have said; “The God of Mercy forgive your sins, the God of Peace give you Peace that passes all understanding, and the God of Love grant that your Love may abound more and more, that you may be rooted and grounded in Love.

And all this proceeds from the one and the same person; for albeit Mercy be ascribed to the Father, Peace to the Son, and Love to the Holy Ghost: Creation to the Father, Redemption to the Son, and Sanctification to the Holy Ghost, yet all these create, redeem, and sanctify. For we worship one God in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity, we confound neither the persons, not yet their work.

Mercy be unto you, Mercy in God is not passive, but active, Non quoad affectum, sed quoad effectum. No suffering with us in our wants, but succoring us in them.

Mercy is here taken for grace and the mere favor of God. The Apostle therefore in wishing Mercy, Peace, and Love to the Saints, teaches us, Quales esse debent Christiianorum salvutationes, nos literis nostris & epistoles, honorem, epulentiam, salutem, longan vitam amicis optamus, Iudas vero, misericordiam, pacem, charitatem, & dona caelestia, his tribus, Ecclesia opus est, aliter, actum esset. And first he begins with Mercy. For instead of Grace used by the Apostle Paul in sundry of his Epistles, Jude here names Mercy, which is all one. Mercy and Grace is that, whereby all good is conveyed to us: therefore an excellent blessing to be prayed for, and this Grace and Mercy of God is fourfold:

1. General.                                                  3. Temporal.

2. Special.                                                   4. Eternal.

William Jenkyn (1613-1685) on the Mercy of God: General and Special

Jenkyn:

Two things are here principally contained. 1. A duty; “1ooking for the mercy of our Lord Jesus Christ:” where he sets down, 1. What was to be regarded; “the mercy of Christ.” 2. How it was to be regarded by “looking for” it. 2. An inducement encouraging to the performance of that duty; eternal life.”

In the first branch two thin are to be explained. I. What the apostle means by “mercy,” and “the mercy of Christ.”

2. What by “looking for” it.

1. What is meant by “mercy,” to eleos. I have discoursed on those words, ” Mercy to you,” p. 26, 27. To avoid needless repetition, I only say, that mercy as attributed to man is such a sympathy or compassion of heart as inclines us to relieve the miserable. But as attributed to God and Christ in glory, as here, it notes either,

1. A gracious disposition or in for sympathy and compassion, they are not, as learned Zanchius observes, essential

to mercy in itself, but accidental to it, in regard of our present state.

2 The effects and expressions of mercy, or the actual helping of us out of our distresses; and so God is said to have mercy on us, and show mercy to us.

Now these effects of mercy are either common or special. Common, such as are afforded to all men and creatures, Psal. cxlvii. 9; Luke vi. 36, &c. Special, bestowed upon the elect, who are the vessels of mercy, and who only have the inward effects of mercy, in preventing and following grace; the outward, in justifying and glorifying mercy bestowed upon them. And thus mercy is principally to be taken in in this place, and that peculiarly for those gracious expressions and discoveries of mercy which shall be shown toward the faithful in acquitting and delivering them at Christ’s second coming, or coming to judgment. And this is called mercy in Scripture, 2 Tim. i. 18, where the apostle, speaking of Onesiphorus, says “that he may find mercy of the Lord in that day.” And deservedly it is so called…

William Jenkyn, An Exposition Upon the Epistle of Jude (London: Samuel Holdsworth, Paternoster Row, 1839), 346.

Charles Hodge on the General Mercy of God

Hodge:

X. The Tender Mercies of God. Vs. 146 : 9.

[March 11th, I860.]

There are two ways of conceiving of God, the philosophical and the religious, as he stands related to the reason and as he stands related to the heart. According to the one method we regard God as the first ground and cause of all things, as infinite, immutable, eternal, incapable of any relation to space or duration, without succession and without passion or change.

According to the other, we regard him as a person to whom we bear the relation of creatures and children, of responsibility and dependence, to whom we must look for all good, and with whom we can have intercourse, who has towards us the feelings of a father and to whom we can make known our joys and sorrows.

Both these are right, so far as limited and determined by the Scriptures. The one limits the other. If we press the philosophical method so far as to lose the object of the religious affections, we end in Atheism. If we let our affections have full scope we lose the infinite and absolutely perfect, as did the mystic enthusiasts. In the Bible both elements are harmonized; though the latter is the predominant, as it should be with us.

In the interpretation of all such passages as this in which human affections are attributed to God, two things are to be avoided. 1. That we do not ascribe to him anything inconsistent with his nature as the eternal and immutable Jehovah, any perturbation or excitement. 2. That we do not merge everything into figure, as though nothing real was intended; as though the God we worship was a God without consciousness, without knowledge, without regard for his creatures. There is in him something which really answers to the words we use, and which is the proper object of the affections which we exercise.

John Davenant on Divine Mercy and Justice

Davenant:

Whether absolute Reprobation oppose God’s Mercy.

What the Author discourses in general concerning God’s Mercy considered absolutely, comparatively, and in its naturalness, in the amplitude of its object, &c., is to no great purpose, unless upon such antecedents this conclusion will certainly follow, “Therefore Predestination and Reprobation cannot be absolute acts of God’s freewill, but must needs proceed according to his prevision of men’s future acts and deservings. The weakness of these consequents shall in particular be showed hereafter, when I have first set down some general considerations concerning the Mercy or Justice or other virtues in Scripture ascribed unto God.

And first we must know, “That though the names of habitual virtues be attributed unto God, yet it is impossible hat any such habits should truly and really belong unto the Divine will; Quontam habitus non dantur, nisi tanquam supplementa poteniarum earum que intra ordinem potentia non sunt perfectae. Unless therefore we hold God’s power of willing in itself to be imperfect and to want supervenient rectifying habits, we must not avouce with this Author that Justice, Mercy, Holiness, &c., are in God’s will the same in nature which these virtues are in men, and only differing in degree.

Secondly, though in God there be permanent inclination or natural disposition to produce those outward effects which in us proceed from the habitual virtues, as To endow his creatures with many good things, which we term Bounty or Liberality; To help them out of their miseries, which we term Mercy; To punish them according to their misdeserts, which we call Justice, and the like: yet God should not have been covetous or niggardly, had he never diffused drop of his bounty to any creature, but kept and enjoyed his goodness within himself, as he did before the creation: He should not have been cruel or unjust, had he freed no man out of that misery whereunto all mankind was fallen: neither should he have wanted any virtue, or done contrary to his justice, had he freed all men out of their misery, and brought them to eternal felicity. The outward temporal acts therefore of Divine Justice or Mercy may be terminated or not terminated upon any man according to the absolute freewill of the most wise God, and that without opposing any attribute of his. To this purpose Carthusianus, Cum Deus sit bonorum omnium dominator, & in ipsum peccat qui peccat, ipse postest plus conferre de bonis quam sit alicui debitum, & minus inferre de malis, seu totam poenum relaxare, nec in hoc contra sed praeter institutum facere. Vide Halens. part. 1.q.39 art. 4. & 5.