Thomas Wenger: The New Perpsective on Calvin

[For more pre-20^th century historiography on Calvin which is definitely pre-Barthian, which nonetheless correctly identified Calvin’s actual position on the extent of the atonement, go here, scroll down to this header: Pre-20th Century Historiography on Calvin on the Extent of the Atonement. For Calvin’s own stated position on the extent of the atonement, go here.]

There is a new article by Thomas Wenger, “The New Perspective on Calvin: Responding to the Recent Calvin Interpretations,” JETS 50 (2007) 311-328.

Wenger tackles the ‘Calvin versus the Calvinists thesis,’ but takes up the side of what I call the “continuity thesis.” It is an interesting article. Having scanned it, I have a few problems with some things he asserts.

First some qualifications. The article is focused on the question of Calvin’s ordo salutis and how that is, or is not reproduced by his later followers. However, in responding to those who gives a thumbs down on that question, Wenger invokes a series of arguments and claims essentially derived from Richard Muller’s responses to what some have called “the Barthian thesis” regarding the discontinuity between Calvin and the Later Reformers. What interests me here are those responses, not directly the issue of Calvin’s ordo salutis, real or otherwise. Further, Wenger’s main targets are Richard Gaffin and Craig Carpenter. My thoughts here have no bearing on their position.

1) The title. The argument for the “discontinuity thesis” has been around for a long time now.

It was proposed in the 17th C. It was revived in the 18th C. It had supporters in the 19th C (and in this I am not referring to any German Liberal from any century). Its just misleading to assert that the modern discontinuity thesis is primarily a new thing since Barth in the 20th C, or can only be located as arising from 19th C disgruntled liberal Germans. And of course that is the big problem. Normally this topic is discussed in the context of Barth’s early claims and then the claims by others like Torrance, Armstrong, Kendall etc.

Apart from the fact that all these proponents have different points of focus, all counter-polemics have wrapped the issues around these modern forms of the discontinuity thesis. That these arguments from the 1950s allegedly invoke an historiographical method inherited from the certain 19th C German liberals is still beside the point for some of us. Wenger, in this article, does discuss more recent scholars like Gaffin and Graig Carpenter, but he invokes Muller who is essentially still responding to the cluster of arguments tabled by men like Barth, and later by Torrance, Kendal, and Amstrong, et al.

Indeed, Wenger makes this bold claim:

Historiographically, these formulations are problematic on several fronts. First, it is difficult to believe that this late in the game there are still Calvin vs. the Calvinists assertions being made, especially from these scholars. [p., 315.]

Wenger acts surprised that someone may disagree with Muller and others. The danger here is falling into the expert-fallacy, a sort of “white-coat” syndrome.

2) The hinge categories on which the Calvin versus the Calvinists thesis turns are located in the wrong places. The real discussion should include a wider complex of ideas, namely the continuity or not, between nearly all of the original or early Reformers with the Protestant Scholastics. The reseach should be addressing the wider soteriological paradigms of Luther, Melancthon (on the Lutheran side), and of Zwingli, Bullinger, Vermigli, Haller, Oecolampadius, and so forth, with Calvin. The aim here should be to trace out the continuies of language, of exegesis and of theology between all of these men. And then, from this vantage one can then do a compare and contrast with pre-Reformation soteriologies, on the one hand, and then post-Reformation, soteriologies, on the other hand. Then and only then can a proper outline of the shifting (or not) theological expressions, exegesis and theology be set forth.

3) For some of us researching Calvin, the issue should be disconnected from these out-dated debates from the 1950s and following. And so to extend this, the debates should be removed from such questions as whether or not Calvin held to the later Protestant Scholastic ordo salutis. I can agree that in principle there was a basic continuity on this point. Though I cannot help wondering how Wenger does not seem to take into account that any doctrine that sees regeneration as a progressive event, never “completed” so to speak, in the life-time of the believer, as Calvin taught, can then say Calvin’s ordo was the same as the later Protestant Scholastic ordo. And the comment from Calvin I posted the other day does indicate that he follows more the historia salutis as normative for Scripture. But at the end of the day, this is not near the core of the real issues.

4) Wenger asserts:

Over the last three decades Richard Muller has significantly reshaped the contours of the discussion of Reformed scholasticism, culling massive amounts of original sources to prove that the previously accepted view of the Scholastics is in stark contrast to the evidence. For years the reigning paradigm claimed that Reformed or Protestant scholasticism was essentially a rationalistic movement that established its theology on reason, Aristotelian principles, and the central dogma of the divine decree rather than on an exegetically based, Christocentric, biblical theology like that of Calvin… [p., 315.]

This reflects my basic problem with Muller’s arguments on this point. We can all agree that the Protestant Scholastics did not imagine that they were sourcing their knowledge in autonomous human reason, like some proto-Kantian of a later century. Take note of the key phrase there: “established its theology on reason.” We agree, that is a fallacious charge. However, what did happen was that a set of rationalist a priories did kick in, which determined what is and is not theologically possible for the Protestant Scholastics. Every self-conscious Van Tillian should be aware of the import of the phrase: ‘the autonomous man determines what is and is not logically possible.’ If we modify the phrase to: ‘what is and is not theologically possible [for God]’ the rationalism charge now has teeth.

This is so obvious I don’t know why many cannot see this. Because some like Beza operated by an almost axiomatic lapsapsarian a priori, and set of assumptions regarding God, what is and is not possible for God, his exegesis was inexorably determined. That is my claim. I grant that Beza never thought he was sourcing his knowledge or grounding it in autonomous human reason, even Aristotelian reason at that. To defend this, we can examine the interpretation of critical verses like John 3:16, Matthew 23:37, 2 Peter 2:1, and 2 Peter 3:9, to name a few. These verses as exegeted by Calvin are incompatible with a supralapsarian (and infralapsarian) precommitment. The Muller thesis, to my knowledge, cannot account for the sweeping exegetical shift that occurred post-Calvin. And the Muller thesis acts as if Calvin’s exegesis of these verses entails no paradigmatic conflict with the later Protestant Scholastic Lapsarian paradigms. (As an aside the idea that Calvin was a supralapsarian is easily refuted by reading Calvin himself.)

And so, Wenger cites McGrath as saying:

The Starting point of theology thus came to be general principles, not a specific historic event. The contrast with Calvin will be clear. . . . Calvin focused on the specific historical phenomenon of Jesus Christ and moved out to explore its implications . . . . By contrast, Beza began from general principles and proceeded to deduce their consequences for Christian theology. [p., 315.]

To this Wenger replies:

Contrary to this, Muller has provided indisputable evidence that the Reformed scholastics founded their theology on careful, meticulous exegesis, “produced biblical commentaries, critical texts, translations, hermeneutical studies” and “pioneered the use of Judaica in the study of Scripture.” Their use of reason and scholastic categories was simply their means of explaining and organizing their exegetically founded theology; for the Protestant scholastics reason was ministerial, not magisterial. Thus, there is no “contrast” between their theology and Calvin’s in either method or content. There is a great deal more involved in this debate, and since there has been such a vast amount of work done in this area, surveying it here is unnecessary. [p., 315-6.]

To this one can easily grant that the Protestant Scholastics considered that they were engaging in a proper exegetic process. The problem is that some of us think some of their conclusions are the results of an a priori rationalism and theological pre-commitments, which, for example, were not shared by the early Reformers.

5) Nor is about method. The issue in no way hinges on method of argument. If one writer prefers to use a syllogism (as in Ursinus or Vermigli) so what? Again, to locate the debate at this point is part of the out-dated way of seeing this issue.

6) The real issue is not about central dogma questions [p., 317ff.] It is not about finding the central architectonic apex (to mix metaphors) from which Calvin, allegedly, derived or organised his doctrines. Let us grant that Calvin’s ordo docendi is not right or superior just because Calvin used it. But, nonetheless, may be it would have been better had we stayed with it. I think that is a better way of looking at it. I think Calvin was on to something which we may have missed.

7) Wenger, like many, assert that readings of Calvin which contradict the Muller-Nicole thesis are, more or less, grounded in central dogma theses which originated in the 19th C, which were first established in 19th C German liberal theology. What does one do with that? We can grant that there perhaps was not one (or even two or three) theological apex from which Calvin hierarchically spread out his system. But would Wenger grant that there could have been certain definable doctrines in Calvin which were later excised from Calvinian soteriology?

8 ) Once again, the question of ordo docendi has been tabled [p., 318ff]. I know there is some weight that suggests the arrangement can affect the emphasis and direction. Go here for a very interesting article.

It seems to me that the best way to describe the problem by way of analogy. Imagine that there is this discipline of landscape painting. This discipline expects that when painting landscapes a set number of elements must be included. These elements can be anything from mundane choice of colours, to locations of scenes and scenery. Calvin, not being formally trained in the discipline of landscape painting, comes along and paints a magnificent landscape. He has decided to make key elements his focus, whole ignoring others. Later, some of his students, who have been trained in the classic and disciplined way of painting landscapes, want to copy Calvin’s work. But now they include all the elements that should be there, according to the rules. They do this to keep the “balance” etc. It is true that Calvin’s magnificent ideas are included and reproduced, but now they are there in balance with all the other elements.

It seems to me that what Muller does is argue that the same ideas in Calvin are still present in the later Calvinists, but now balanced out and rearranged a little differently, but in such a way that nothing is adversely affected. But the problem is, I think, is that the focus is shifted. For some reasons many cannot see this. So for example, one could use this approach. In Calvin the focus was on vital union with Christ, but in Beza, the focus shifts to decretal union with Christ. I do not know how any could seriously deny this fact. It is not that Beza has denied or neglected vital union, absolutely, but that he has shifted the focus of the landscape. The observer’s gaze and attention are now redirected to other parts of the portrait.

The question is, was this shifting of focus the “right” thing to have happened?

But at the end of the day, this is still part of the out-dated discussion which arose out of the 1950s debates. Let us grant very readily that the ordo docendi question in no way justifies the Calvin versus the Calvinists thesis. We can agree that the issue is not hinged on theological arrangement of the Institutes and so forth. I prefer Calvin’s ordo docendi, but I also enjoy reading Musculus who uses a traditional ordo docendi.

9) Wenger discusses the “problem” of proof-texting Calvin [p., 321.] Wenger:

I said earlier that in addition to problematic historiography, the NPC utilizes erratic readings of Calvin to establish its case. As all too frequently happens in debates of this sort, each side can seemingly “out-prooftext” the other, often leading to futile stalemates. So my goal is not merely to provide contrary quotations, but rather to show that the way in which the NPC selects its evidence from Calvin is just as flawed as its historiography and that it proceeds to a large degree from it [p., 321.].

I can easily see that proof-texting Calvin can be dangerous. However, the problem is, everyone needs to start with the empirical data from which one derives general deductions. My problem with many of the supporters of the Nicole-Muller thesis is that they reverse this. They start with broad deductions and them retroject them into Calvin. And when others claim that we need to derive our conclusions inductively, we are often shouted down. And Wenger himself examples this type of response:

Rather than a proper exegesis of Calvin, the NPC frequently culls quotations from various and sundry locations in his work and then arranges them without proper concern for their original proximity. In addition, its proponents often give less than objective interpretations to his words which do not do justice to his actual position. To a degree this occurs, it seems, because of the artificial interpretive grid these scholars have brought to the text, which has not arisen out of an impartial comparison of elements within Calvin’s broader corpus. [p., 321.]

What this amounts to is that any text from Calvin adduced to challenge the Nicole-Muller thesis is rejected on the grounds that it is out of context. My problem is, people never tell me why it is out of context, other than to assert things like, “well Calvin did not mean that, because he believed in this…” I find this sort of response as dangerously circular.

And so the claims go, those texts cannot be adduced because his wider theological assumption precludes a reading of that text which would contradict this assumed theological paradigm. When folk tell me that I am taking Calvin out of context and that I must interpret him according to his (alleged) overall theological paradigm, I find that this means it is not possible to critique or correct or evaluate this alleged calvinian paradigm. There is no way to test their interpretive model of Calvin because they refuse to allow empirical or inductive data to have a proper bearing upon their interpretive model. And course though, it is quite acceptable for others to lift proof-texts from Calvin without being challenged.

The only way around this, as I see it, is request or demand inductive evidence from proponents of the Nicole-Muller thesis to support their interpretive paradigm. This though, requires patience, time and a willingness to converse. It requires that one allows his or her arguments to be evaluated. Thus, evidence from the one side is tabled, and then evaluated. If the paradigmatic claims of that one side cannot be inductively established from the Calvinian corpus, honesty says these paradigmatic claims cannot then be used to ground any attempt to preclude any reading of Calvin which contradicts this same wider theological paradigm. Thus the “proof-texts” are then allowed to have their true force. Make sense?

So to conclude, overall, the article is interesting, but at the end of the day I do not think it gets the heart of the issues, but applies an out-dated cluster of responses to a new set of thinkers (eg Gaffin and Carpenter), who for their part, apparently essentially agree with the Muller thesis.

What I do no see Wenger doing is critiquing Muller. Of course, that is because he has already assumed Muller to be a completely reliable interpreter of Calvin.

David